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ROLE EXPECTATIONS AS FOREIGN POLICY: SOUTH 
AMERICAN SECONDARY POWERS’ EXPECTATIONS OF 
BRAZIL AS A REGIONAL POWER1 
 
LESLIE E. WEHNER 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
 
 
This article sets out how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, Chile, 
and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power, as well as Brazil’s strategy of using its 
regional powerhood to further its own ambitions of becoming a global power on the 
international stage. The article assesses the expectations of these three countries, 
specifically in terms of what kind of roles they attribute to Brazil. Following this empirical 
interest, the article develops a role theoretical framework for understanding the 
importance of Others’ expectations for the role conception and enactment of the Self. The 
article also elaborates on the interplay of master roles and auxiliary roles in which Others 
become key shapers of those roles, as well as on how the role interaction between a 
regional power and the secondary powers is bound to their differing notions of “region,” 
as strategically used by each as part of their foreign policy.  
 
 
                                                          
1 The author would like to thank Miriam Prys, the journal’s anonymous reviewers, and the editor of 
Foreign Policy Analysis for very helpful comments on early versions of this article.  
This article establishes how secondary powers in South America—that is, Argentina, 
Chile, and Venezuela—see Brazil as a regional power. It also assesses how these states 
perceive Brazil’s aspiration to becoming a global power.1 Brazil has, by mediating in crises 
and leading regional groups, been proactive in its quest to secure a predominant position 
in South America. Brazil has also sought to lead multilateral institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005, and again in 2013.2 It has made claims along with 
India, Japan, and Germany (G4) for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). Brazil has thus tried to consolidate its regional position, from where it 
seeks to build a global role (Brands 2010). The country’s rise has, however, triggered 
among its regional relevant Others a certain set of expectations, ones which have thus far 
remained neglected in the studies on this emergence.  
 The article thus analyzes the expectations of secondary powers vis-à-vis Brazil and 
develops a symbolic interaction role theory framework to understand the importance of 
Others’ expectations for a state rising on both the regional and international scene. The 
article advances the argument that Others can shape and affect the way the master role and 
its auxiliary roles are being conceived and enacted. Status is considered synonymous to a 
master role, which is the most salient attribute of an actor in an asymmetrical social system, 
following both its material and social constitutive elements (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 
2010, 180–81). “Regional power” and “secondary power” are thus considered master roles. 
The article also shows that the role-based interaction between the regional power and 
secondary powers are bound to these actors’ different understandings of what the region 
they interact in is.  
Role theory has recaptured scholarly attention in foreign policy analysis (Thies 2010; 
Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2012). However, role theory remains “thin” in some of its 
theoretical assumptions. The underdevelopment in question is the importance of Others’ 
expectations for the enactment of a master status and its auxiliary roles. Master roles are 
sustained through the enactment of specific functions; that is, auxiliary roles casted in a 
relational way. Others may accept or reject, and compete with or follow, these roles by 
voicing their expectations.  
Status is at the center of the definition of roles, as the latter encompasses the social 
position of an actor in a group and its meaning as a social category bestowed by Others 
(Elgström and Smith 2006, 5; Thies 2010, 2–3). This perspective brings together a positional 
understanding of actors within social groups, and the making of groups through their 
interactions. The importance of Others’ expectations is key for the role conception of a 
state, as the latter emerge in the interaction of the self-conception side and the role 
expectation dimensions—the latter understood as the expectations that the Other (Alter) 
ascribes and expects the Self (Ego) to enact (Kirste and Maull 1996, 289).   
A regional power is a state with superior material capabilities that also has a self-
perception—and Others’ recognition—as holding that master role within a region (Nolte 
2010, 889–94). Thus, secondary powers are the second top-tier of states in a regional 
hierarchy. Their secondary position is determined by their relative material and social 
dimensions, which make possible their self-perception (and Others’ recognition) as being 
part of a group of secondary states vis-à-vis a regional and minor powers (Flemes 2010, 
103).  
The underdeveloped work on expectations in role theory matches the lack of empirical 
studies conducted to date on Brazil’s rise. Most works neglect the importance of Others’ 
views for Brazil’s ability to enact the role of  regional power (Flemes 2010; Schirm 2010; 
Christensen 2013). Brazil needs recognition from its regional neighbors, among whom 
uncertainty about the potential risks of Brazil’s rise are more pronounced (Malamud 
2011a). Moreover, focusing on Others’ expectations may illuminate whether Brazil’s is a 
regional power playing auxiliary roles consistently across security and economic issue-
areas.  
Elgström (2007) sheds light on why it is beneficial to study external views: First, 
Others’ views can help to elucidate how far states esteem a particular state as an 
international actor. Second, the impact of the Ego’s foreign policy depends on how the 
targeted state (Alter) receives and evaluates Ego’s action. Finally, role expectations toward 
other states should also be considered an important aspect of a state’s own foreign policy-
making. As such, they should also reflect those relevant Others’ foreign policy goals and 
behaviors.  
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: First, the interplay of master roles, 
auxiliary roles, and role expectations is presented, as is the connection between roles and 
regions. A description of methodology and of how the data was gathered is also provided. 
Second, Argentina’s expectations toward Brazil are first studied with regard to what 
definition(s) of the region both countries hold (Latin America or South America), and how 
they are used in their role interactions; second, regarding regional integration initiatives; 
third, regarding crises in the region; and, fourth, regarding Brazil’s role in the UN and the 
G20—that is, the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Banks Governors. The 
period of study for the Argentinean case covers the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner (2003-
2007) and in part that of Cristina Fernández (2007–present).3 Third, the case of Chile is 
introduced along the same lines as that of Argentina, therein covering the presidencies of 
Ricardo Lagos (2000–06), Michelle Bachelet (2006–10), and Sebastian Piñera (2010–
present). Fourth, Venezuela’s expectations of Brazil are then analyzed, focusing on the era 
of the presidency of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013); specifically, following the failed coup 
d’état of 2002.4  This section also addresses Brazil’s role in the relationship between 
Venezuela and the United States. Finally, a comparison of the three cases is presented as 
part of the conclusion.  
 
Master and Auxiliary Roles in a Region 
Roles and Master Roles  
Roles are the patterns of appropriate or expected behavior of an actor, which are drawn 
from its social position within an organized group (Elgström and Smith 2006). Roles are 
constituted in an interactional way. This means that the identities of actors are the products 
of a social process, because “meaningful identity affirmation does not occur outside social 
categories, such as roles” (McCourt 2011, 1605). This assignation of social identity to 
actors is based on the information that Alter has about Ego. One important criterion for 
locating a state within a social structure is its master role (Thies 2001, 2012, 2013).   
Master roles are overarching positions in the international system (Thies 2001). Thies 
(2001, 708; 2012, 34) develops a taxonomy of states positions such as “emerging states,” 
“minor members,” “major members,” and “great powers.” These are ideal-types that also 
serve as master roles. As Thies seeks to contribute to the debate on the socialization of 
states within the international system, the regional level is not included in his assessment. 
Nevertheless, his taxonomy is a good starting point for conceptualizing regional power as 
a master role, and in that way capturing the dynamics of interaction between the regional 
and the secondary power(s) within a region. If the regional level is a key component of the 
international system (Hurrell 2007), then regional powerhood should be also considered as 
a status position of and on its own—and hence not as an auxiliary role. 
 
(Figure 1: HERE).  
 
Although this article follows Thies’ work—which gives more weight to the importance 
of material structure and capabilities for enacting a master role—it differs from it in two 
important regards, ones that serve to complement these approaches to master roles. First, 
the article elaborates on the interplay of master status and its auxiliary functions from the 
perspective of the Others’ expectations. Second, the focus is not exclusively on the process 
of locating a master role within a material structure, but rather on the social process of role 
conception. Role conception involves the Ego’s own perception of its social position vis-
à-vis Alter(’s) position(s) and expectations (Kirste and Maull 1996).  
However, a symbolic interaction perspective does not neglect the importance of 
structures. Not any role can be played by a state, and this choice is still partly limited by 
its material capabilities (McCourt 2012, 381; Thies 2012, 29). Instead, a symbolic-
interactionist approach brings up to the fore the social nature of the structure, the 
nonreification of it, and the importance of the actors’ agency capacity to cast and change 
roles based on the interaction Ego–Alter (McCourt 2012).  
Therefore, Brazil’s master role does not exclusively depend on this state’s self-
awareness of its predominant material position in South America. It is also about whether 
or not the actors of the region recognize Brazil as holding a specific status, as well as about 
whether the secondary powers either favor or hamper its strive for global powerhood. 
“Brazil can and must contribute to the construction of world order (…) conscious of its 
demographic, territorial, economic, and cultural weight, and of being a great democracy 
undergoing social transformation” (Celso Amorin, former minister of foreign affairs, in 
Spektor 2010, 199). However, this self-conception is also attributed by Others. For 
example, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently highlighted that “Brazil is 
transiting from regional power to global power” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 
Chile 2012). However, the recognition of Brazil’s master role and its global aspiration may 
differ from the type of auxiliary roles that the regional Others attribute to Brazil, depending 
on the issue-area at stake.  
Brazil is also depicted as a “consensual hegemon” (Burges 2008), as it seeks to 
downplay the use of coercion so as to reduce regional contestation in order to gain support 
in its quest for global powerhood (Christensen 2013, 272). Thus, the category of 
consensual hegemon implies that Brazil does not impose its interests on Others. Brazil 
rather seeks to attract South American states to a common goal, which further validates the 
study of Others’ expectations—despite these emanating from states positioned beneath 
Brazil in the regional hierarchy. If Brazil’s self-conception is regional power, then others 
must have attributed this social quality to Brazil as well. What others expect from Brazil 
matters for enacting both the master role and its auxiliary roles of leader, mediator, and 
coordinator, as well as for the way in which Brazil is trying to enact a global power role. 
Therefore, studying Others’ role expectations helps to offset the structural approach of 
role theory, as inspired by Realism in international relations (see, for example, Walker 
1987; Thies 2001).5 Instead, a symbolic interaction role theory approach connects with 
those social constructivist perspectives highlighting the states’ ability to constitute social 
identities relationally (Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2011).6 In fact, material capabilities are 
not enough for establishing a hierarchical order, as Others’ acceptance is a key 
precondition for a hierarchy to even exist.7 Otherwise, the relationship between Ego and 
Alter—if explained in terms of pure material power—will be informed by primacy and not 
by hierarchy, as the latter has to be conceived in a consensual format. Actors underneath 
the hegemon need to manifest some form of acceptance of the hierarchy (Clark 2011). 
However, acceptance does not exclude the fact that regional powers face suspicion—and 
even hostility and verbal resistance—at the regional level, typically in the form of fear and 
jealousy (cf. Prys 2010, 492). Thus, states situated beneath the top-tier state may aspire to 
shape the nature and membership of a regional hierarchy—and, consequently, the lead 
state’s master and auxiliary roles.   
 
Auxiliary Roles and Observations 
Role expectations are also relevant for understanding the process of attributing or resisting 
the auxiliary roles of the Self. Auxiliary roles are embedded in the master role, and as such 
enacting auxiliary roles is made possible by the social and material conditions of the actor 
(Thies 2012, 33–34)—as well as by the Others’ attribution of the auxiliary roles. Likewise, 
the enactment of auxiliary roles is also dependent on the context wherein the actor holding 
a master status is expected to act (Elgström and Smith 2006, 5). Thus, secondary powers 
should attribute and recognize the master role of regional power to Brazil as being an 
achieved role.  
As Brazil is recognized as having regional powerhood yet framed under the umbrella 
of being a consensus-seeking actor, Others’ expectations are that the auxiliary roles should 
show signs of this concurrent technique for enacting the master role being present. Thus, 
secondary powers should expect Brazil to enact a leadership, mediator, coordinator, and/or 
security provider role, but within regional groups where the playing out of a specific 
auxiliary role can be shared with those Others.  
If a regional group in which to interact does not exist, then secondary powers are likely 
to opt for the dual or shared playing of these auxiliary roles with the regional power. If 
these expectations are not met, then contestation of the auxiliary role dominates the 
interaction regional power–secondary power. Moreover, role attributors might tend to see 
Brazil’s global role as an aspirational status (not achieved), although some may also 
welcome Brazil’s greater involvement on the international level.  
Therefore, when speaking of master roles it is also possible to understand why the same 
actor can enact other roles that make full use of the social identity that the master role has 
provided to the state in question. The master role becomes the mold for these auxiliary 
roles. It also possible to understand how a master role such as regional power emerges in 
the process of differentiation between Ego and Alter, which may create different counter 
roles for those Others (Harnisch 2011, 8). A lot of what it is communicated from secondary 
powers depends on their most salient auxiliary roles. The secondary power master role is 
linked to the enactment of the soft-balancer auxiliary role.8 In fact, Argentina, Chile, and 
Venezuela tend to engage in forms of soft-balancing. An example of this is institutional 
binding, done for the purpose of limiting Brazil’s role enactments and reducing the risks 
of a potential excessive level of growth on its part—achieved especially by creating or 
supporting the formation of regional institutions (Nolte 2010, 895).  
 
Region and Roles 
The interaction between a regional and secondary power unfolds within a regional space. 
Even when a regional power aspires to a global power role, the importance of the region 
in terms of acceptance/rejection from Others may affect the constitution of the new master 
role. Thus, regional powers’ interactions with secondary powers are bound up in the social 
construction of a region. In fact, the political behavior of states is the main force delineating 
and revising the limits of a region (Prys 2010). Region is not an objective category; it is a 
politically contingent phenomenon, and thus a contested one (Hurrell 2007, 241). Yet, the 
master roles of regional and secondary powers are built from and within a regional space. 
Thus, “[a] region (…) consists of two or more members in geographical proximity, is 
characterized by regular interactions between them, and is perceived by both internal and 
external actors as a distinct regional space” (Prys 2010, 485).  
The aforementioned conceptualization builds on others’ understandings of regions 
defined by their boundaries, anarchic nature, polarity, and social construction (Adler and 
Barnett 1998; Buzan and Waever 2003). This notion of region—in which the social 
interactions between Ego and Alter are key to its evolutionary form, and limits—allows 
for the possibility of actors having different regional narratives to choose from (Prys 2010).  
In fact, Brazil traditionally depicted itself as a Latin American power, but has recently 
enacted a South American narrative. This choice, designed to depict a new sphere of 
influence for itself, actually shows the limitations of Brazil’s power projection to the rest 
of Latin America (Spektor 2010). Nonetheless, the three secondary powers contest this 
narrative, and play a power game by promoting their own regional conceptualizations.9 
 
Methodology and Data 
Symbolic interaction relies on interpretative methods (Denzin 1990, 111). The 
interpretative process of role conceptions and playing takes place discursively (McCourt 
2011). For this reason, the article explores the rhetoric of secondary powers in South 
America.  
Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are secondary powers as they have more material and 
social power than the region’s minor powers—such as Ecuador and Uruguay—but less 
than that of Brazil. The latter also recognizes these three countries as secondary powers. 
Additionally, the secondary powers are proactive countries vis-à-vis Brazil, which makes 
the three of them relevant Alters.  
Colombia is excluded as secondary power. The relationship with Brazil has previously 
been described as nonexistent, and only recently has evolved into one of mutual 
rediscovery under the mandate of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–present). Mexico, 
meanwhile, is considered a potential regional competitor to Brazil when the focus is on 
Latin America. The role of the former is analyzed here from the perspectives of the three 
secondary powers, as Mexico offers the three secondary states a means to curb the effects 
of Brazil’s rise. 
The article focuses on the foreign policy elites from the secondary powers as they speak 
on behalf of each respective state. It pays attention to the voices of presidents, ministers of 
foreign affairs, defense, and international trade, as well as diplomats and policy advisors 
within the Executive. These are the key actors in the foreign policy-making of these three 
countries, which are all strong presidential regimes in which, consequently, the influence 
of the legislature remains low.  
The article relies on those governmental declarations that reflect the positions of the 
three countries with regard to UNSC reform, their view of informal institutions such as the 
G20, and their initiatives and policies concerning regional cooperation groups such as the 
ALBA, CELAC, MERCOSUR, Pacific Alliance, and the UNASUR.10  
The research also relies heavily on 84 interviews that were conducted with current and 
former top officials from the ministries mentioned above.11 The interviews are interpreted 
as a whole, to recreate the narrative of each country’s expectations of Brazil. Some specific 
interviews are also quoted, but only when needed to illustrate a particular point. The 
interviews were conducted in an open-ended format to give the interviewees the freedom 
to elaborate on their own experiences with regard to their country’s relationship with Brazil.  
A benefit of using interviews is having a better grasp of how foreign policy-makers have 
adapted the type of narrations when internal or external changes to the state took place. However, 
interviews also have their limitations. In fact, actors tend to recall past events in a nonlinear 
order, and give more importance to some facts than others. In order to counterbalance this 
possible bias, interviews should be contrasted with written sources. Yet there are internal 
aspects of the foreign policy decision-making process that may be relevant but for which written 
materials do not exist. If this is the case, one needs to make sure that these facts are corroborated 
by other oral testimonies as well. If more testimonies do not confirm a fact, then the episode in 
question should be considered invalid and dispensed with accordingly.  
Interviews have rarely been used by role theorists, but when treated carefully they can allow 
the capturing of the specific context and the specific reasons behind decision-makers’ choices 
to enact and attribute to others a particular role. Furthermore, interviews can also supplement 
some of the general governmental or regional groupings’ documents, as well as the rationale 
behind some of the fragmented declarations that have been made to the media.  
 
Argentina’s Role Expectations of Brazil  
Overview of the Role Relationship 
Brazil’s attempt to attract Argentina to follow its leadership is “tantamount to sleeping 
with the enemy” (Malamud 2011a, 11). In fact, Argentina still sees itself as Brazil’s (soft-
)balancer in the region (Russell and Totaktlian 2003). These states’ relationship has been 
captured by the term “competitive-partnership” (Malamud 2011b, 92). However, 
Argentina faces limitations on the competitive side of this relationship. “The difference 
between our past and present is that now we have to balance by establishing links with 
other countries, whereas in the past we could do this pretty much on our own.”12 The 
competitive–cooperative relationship makes Argentina skeptical when speaking about 
Brazil as a regional power. Yet when it does, it specifies the limits of regional powerhood, 
since “it is not a concept with unlimited plasticity (…) it is not a condition for sitting at the 
table with the big guys.”13 
 
(Figure 2: HERE) 
 
Role Expectations in the Definition of the Region 
Argentina is both a Latin and a South American country. Brazil, however, prioritizes South 
America (Malamud 2011a). Argentina attributes Brazil a Latin American regional power 
role. It does so to play on the concept of multiple regions, thereby hoping to prevent Brazil 
from becoming a too strong power in South America. By showing the openness, and 
different possible levels, of regionality—that is, Latin and/or South America—Argentina 
tries to position itself as being similar to its neighbor, as well as the natural (soft-)balancer 
to Brazil in South America. “For us, a regional power should be for the entire Latin 
American region and not exclusive to South America (…) and there is no such actor in the 
region who has the capabilities to cover the whole of Latin America.”14  
Argentina plays the role of soft-balancer by making tacit alliances with other actors 
using a similar regional conceptualization. The use of such alliances to limit Brazil’s 
regional powerhood demonstrates Argentina’s secondary power master role, since it uses 
its relations with Chile and Venezuela—as well as with Mexico, which it is seeking to 
further incorporate into South America—when it communicates its expectations to Brazil 
as a Latin American regional power. Mexico is seen as a strong competitor to Brazil 
(Malamud and Gardini 2012). Hence, this role attribution to Brazil is in no way a benign 
act, as the intention is to hamper its exclusive exertion of the regional power role—as well 
as to create options beyond South America and Brazil, so as to prevent the latter’s possible 
exertion of regional domination. Moreover, Argentina’s playing of the role of soft-
balancer, specifically with its invocation of the Latin American region, has invigorated a 
geographical space that aligns with the social constructions of new regional schemes, such 
as the CELAC.  
 
Role Expectations in Regional Integration Initiatives and Regional Crises 
Brazil has embraced the CELAC with relative skepticism, whereas Argentina has become 
increasingly more enthusiastic about the grouping because it brings together Mexico and 
Brazil under one institutional umbrella (Tokatlian 2013, 28). In fact, Argentina recognizes 
that Brazil will not benefit more than other countries in this group given that Central 
America is a disputed area of influence. Thus, Brazil’s projection in Central America 
within the CELAC is where it might reveal its limitations as a regional power, specifically 
in its difficulties to perform the leader auxiliary role. Moreover, the situation tends to 
enable Argentina to play on the need of Brazil to include, and cooperate with, its neighbor 
if it wants to advance some issues within this institutional setting. 
Argentina sees Brazil as a partner in the sustenance of the MERCOSUR (Taiana 2006, 
12), which involves a symmetrical view of Brazil (Malamud 2011b). While Argentina 
continues to recognize Brazil’s leading role in this integration scheme, it is nevertheless a 
role expectation voiced in anticipation of reciprocity—as Argentina, in return, expects 
recognition of a leadership role for itself in the MERCOSUR. In fact, both countries 
exerted dual leadership and mediator roles within the MERCOSUR to impede the 
breakdown of democracy in Paraguay in 1996, 1999, and 2000. As Argentina attributes a 
similar role to Brazil as it does to itself, it seeks to hamper any action by Brazil that might 
displace Argentina from its sharing of the leader and mediator roles. As the MERCOSUR 
has become a political platform that may serve Brazil’s own power aspirations, Argentina 
has seen in the further inclusion of Venezuela in the group the emergence of a potential 
ally whose presence could help balance any possible displacement by Brazil (Malamud 
2011a, 11). In this sense, the differentiation between Argentina and Brazil is on the master 
role that both have, as they exert similar auxiliary roles. Yet, it is at Brazil’s discretion to 
create and give Argentina the space for sharing functions in the MERCOSUR. 
The UNASUR has been recognized as a Brazilian project intended to be used for 
advancing its global aspirations (Brands 2010). Instead, Argentina communicates to Brazil 
the need to share the leader role in this regional group, and reciprocity from Brazil is a sine 
qua non condition for Argentina to validate the former’s leadership role within this 
institution. “It seems that Brazil also allows us to be leaders where we have the expertise 
for the good functioning or institutionalization of the UNASUR.”15  
Reciprocity also occurs regarding the role of mediator in the region. Most responses to 
crises have been managed within the UNASUR—such as those of secessionist movements 
in Bolivia (2008), the issue of U.S. military bases on Colombian soil, the border tensions 
between Venezuela and Colombia (2010), and Ecuador’s police crisis that would 
jeopardize the country’s democratic stability (2010) (Nolte and Wehner 2013). Argentina 
recognizes the importance of Brazil when it comes to calling for the peaceful resolution of 
such conflicts, and to bringing opposing factions together to talk, but these are seen 
ultimately as being joint ventures with other countries.  
We are all leaders when it comes to solving conflicts and crises, as it is the 
institution which acts as a mediator (…) it is the institution, and not Brazil the 
mediator, as we [Argentina] are as active as Brazil in mediating.16 
 
Role Expectations at the International Level 
Argentina speaks of Brazil as a regional power. However, such a master role is delimited 
only to the region, and is not seen as being equivalent to global powerhood. In fact, it is 
considered beyond Argentina’s reach to bestow the recognition of such status, as Argentina 
sees the U.S. as the main attributor of whether a state holds a global role.  
We were extremely astonished by Brazil’s attempt to play a role globally when 
it tried to mediate between Iran and the rest of the UNSC (…). It is clear that 
the response from the U.S. was “go back to your regional affairs as this is not 
your place.”17 
However, Argentina continues to deny its neighbor the global power role so as to 
hamper its rise, especially given that Argentina itself has not been incorporated into the 
bigger picture by Brazil. Argentina is thus seeking to prevent an increase in their already 
asymmetrical relationship. Moreover, Argentina’s fear is that Brazil will no longer need 
the region—and thus Argentina—if Brazil achieves global power status. Hence, 
Argentina’s strategy toward Brazil is to try to restrain its emergence, as well as to ensure 
that mutual dependency between them is always strong (Malamud 2011b, 92–93). “We 
want a powerful Brazil that benefits all of us, but we see sometimes Brazil wanting to 
benefit only itself when it wants a permanent seat in the UNSC.”18 
In the G20, meanwhile, Argentina sees Brazil as an ally—as both countries jointly 
coordinate positions (Petrella 2011, 90). However, Argentina sees the G20 as a U.S.-driven 
enterprise. The view within this informal institution is one of cooperation, as both countries 
defend similar governance principles in light of the existing Global North–South divide. 
Argentina sees Brazil as acting in the role of an ally, as there is a structural symmetry given 
by the setting. Moreover, Argentina also makes clear it has other partnership options within 
the G20 (Petrella 2011), so that Brazil is more inclined to incorporate and listen to it within 
this institution. 
 
Chile’s Role Expectations of Brazil  
Overview of the Role Relationship 
Chile is a reliable partner for Brazil, as it follows the principles of respecting and abiding 
by international law and contracts (Malamud 2011a). This view is also aligned with Chile’s 
global trade role whose first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) priorities were established 
outside of South America—that is, in Europe, North America, and Asia. In fact, Chile 
prefers to pursue its FTA policy in a bilateral way and not within regional groupings 
(Wehner 2011a).  
Chile’s bilateral preference also permeates its relationship with Brazil, as it is also how 
Chile approaches its dealings with this country—the latter, however, would prefer Chile’s 
stronger commitment to Brazil’s initiatives for regional integration. Chile attributes to 
Brazil a leadership role in the region, whose main quality should be consensus. This type 
of leadership has dual effects as, on the one hand, Chile expects from Brazil inclusion in 
leadership initiatives in the region, but, on the other, it also gives Chile enough room to 
pursue its own strategy of preventing “regional” entrapment in the different integration 
schemes of South America—with the purpose of creating extra-regional options so as to 
reduce the existing asymmetry with Brazil (Wehner 2011b). Nonetheless, ultimately it is 
at Brazil’s discretion whether or not to incorporate Chile into its leadership initiatives in 
the South American region.  
 
(Figure 3: HERE). 
 
Role Expectations in the Definition of the Region 
Chile tries to prevent itself from falling into an exclusive South American region, mainly 
because of its difficult bilateral relationships with Bolivia and Peru. Yet, this Latin 
American emphasis is also a way of keeping its options open with regard to Brazil. Chile 
has, especially under Piñera’s government, sought to incorporate Mexico as a partner 
(Gobierno de Chile 2011), and also sees that country as potentially playing a balancer role 
vis-à-vis Brazil in Latin America. In fact, Chile feels that it has more in common with 
Mexico than with Brazil regarding its foreign economic policy agenda. 
 What Chile has also done is to employ different regional views —including a 
hemispheric one so as to maintain a good relationship with the U.S.—rather than opting 
exclusively for South America. “There are more regions than South America, such as the 
Americas and Latin America. We are part of all of them, though Brazil would rather prefer 
that we have a more salient South American vocation.”19 In this way, Chile has distanced 
itself from Brazil’s notion of South America while also recognizing the regional power 
role of that country—as well as, potentially, of Mexico. In this sense, Brazil wants 
exclusivity in this role prescription. Chile’s role attribution to Brazil alongside 
incorporating Mexico as a possible important player in the region suggests that its strategy 
is to soft-balance Brazilian regional foreign policy interests. 
 
Role Expectations in Regional Integration Initiatives and Regional Crises 
The necessity for regional groups is a Brazilian notion; Chile would instead prefer a region 
without groups that restrict its economic sovereignty. Chile prefers regional organizations 
that only coordinate political and security issues, but which do not involve the economic 
integration or trade negotiations that it considers a hindrance to its own development—
such as is the case with the attempt by Brazil to negotiate the Free Trade Association of 
the Americas (FTAA) as one block, a process which has stalled since 2005. In these 
negotiations, Chile ascribed a leadership role to the U.S. rather than to Brazil.  
Role ambiguity emerges in the case of Chile regarding its expectations of Brazil, as it 
downplayed the latter’s leadership role when it created the MERCOSUR and then invited 
Chile to become a full member of the group. Nonetheless, Argentina and Brazil 
accommodated and accepted Chile’s desire to have an associate status within it. Moreover, 
Chile recognizes the MERCOSUR as an Argentinean and Brazilian initiative. Yet, Chile 
also seeks to reduce its economic and political dependence on Brazil and the MERCOSUR 
by broadening its trade options beyond Latin America (Wehner 2011a). 
This skeptical view of regional initiatives, one that results in ongoing ambiguity in 
terms of expectations and attributions of a leadership role to Brazil, is concordant with the 
prioritization that Chile gives to its bilateral relations in South America. Chile’s 
reservations about integration schemes were well expressed by former minister of foreign 
affairs Mariano Fernández (2009–10) after leaving his post, 
The multilateral efforts for integration in Latin America do not have a happy 
destiny. For this reason, from the beginning of the Concertación governments, 
and without abandoning the integration spirit, [Chile] also uses the practical 
and effective way of bilateral accords on the Latin American continent; like, 
for example, the ambitious Treaty of Integration of Maipu signed between 
Chile and Argentina (Fernández 2010, 4). 
More recently, Chile has become an active member of the UNASUR as it is not a 
binding project (in terms of restricting this country’s sovereignty). During Michelle 
Bachelet’s government, Chile held the first pro tempore presidency of this institution. “For 
Chile it was not an option to be outside of the UNASUR (…) we wanted to be able to shape 
the institutions of the UNASUR from within.”20 Yet, Chile is still rather skeptical about 
the direction that the UNASUR may take in the future under Brazil’s leadership (Gamboa 
2011, 13). “We are an important ally for Brazil in the UNASUR (…) but we are also 
including other regional initiatives in order to diversify our options.”21 
Regarding the UNASUR’s security agenda, Chile works—as its main partner—
together with Argentina by exerting a dual leadership role in this issue-area. However, 
Chile also perceives that this leadership role is aligned with Brazil’s own security agenda 
and thus is made possible by that country. Hence, Chile is willing to recognize Brazil’s 
auxiliary role in the UNASUR if it allows in return a sharing of the stage on security issues.  
Chile was also an active country in the formation of the Pacific Alliance. This initiative 
has created distance between Chile and Brazil because it has brought  Mexico into South 
America, does not include Brazil in the project, and because it attempts to soft-balance 
Brazil to prevent its possible regional hegemony (Malamud-Rikles 2012). Working 
together with Argentina—as well as Colombia and Mexico—is also a means for Chile to 
constrain Brazil’s power within the CELAC. Thus, Chile recognizes Brazil’s position at 
the top of the regional hierarchy, yet seeks to prevent their social asymmetry from 
increasing—done by resorting to tactics of institutional binding in the UNASUR and the 
CELAC at the same time as investing in the building of alternative regional groups like the 
Pacific Alliance.  
In addition, Chile recognizes, without many “buts,” Brazil’s auxiliary roles of 
mediator, facilitator, and crises manager in cases of regional strife. Brazil is seen as the 
main actor when it comes to resolving regional crises in South America. However, Brazil’s 
mediation role would perhaps not be recognized by Chile if it was to be exerted outside of 
the UNASUR.22 Whereas Chile sees Brazil as the main mediator in regional crises, it does 
not recognize the same role when Chile is part of the problem—such as in the dispute 
between Bolivia and Chile (2003) over access to the sea for the former. Brazil offered to 
mediate in what Chile considers to be a bilateral and not a regional problem (Tokatlian 
2013, 30).   
In addition, Chile’s view of Brazil’s role in the peacekeeping operation in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) is one of symmetry. In fact, Chile sees this mission not as an exclusively 
Brazilian initiative, but as a U.N. initiative wherein the responsibilities for coordination 
and management lie predominantly with South American powers, mainly Brazil and Chile 
(joint leadership), while also including the participation of other countries like the U.S., 
Canada, and France as well as of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay. 
There are many countries contributing with forces to the peacekeeping 
operation (…) there is a myth here that this is an initiative solely led by Brazil. 
The main responsibility is with all the Latin American countries involved in 
this operation.23  
 
Role Expectations at the International Level 
Chile supports Brazil’s claim for a permanent seat at the UNSC for bilateral and strategic 
reasons, as part of the recognition of the latter’s regional power role. Yet, it is not exactly 
clear whether this support is entirely explained by the relationship with Brazil or rather by 
the relationships with the other G4 member states. Chile supports the G4’s claim for a 
permanent seat at the UNSC, in line with the interest of deepening the good relationships 
built in recent decades with Germany and Japan. Moreover, Chile has also granted such 
support to India as a way of creating the conditions for a possible FTA negotiation. In fact, 
Brazil’s claim for a permanent seat at the UNSC is seen by Chile as not being realizable in 
the near future because of the existing veto players. Hence, the costs of supporting Brazil’s 
claim are low for Chile, and the gains—in terms of keeping up the good relationships with 
the G4 members—high. What Chile expects in return from supporting Brazil’s claim for a 
permanent seat is that the latter listens to its regional peers—and thus to Chile—on the 
future steps it might take, especially on those matters regarding the Latin American region 
(Piñera 2011).  
Chile recognizes Brazil’s regional power role and its economic importance, yet both 
countries have different perspectives on economic governance issues given Chile’s quest 
to preserve its independency in this domain from the rest of the South American countries. 
In the context of the G20, of which Chile is not a member, it does not recognize Brazil as 
holding the leader, mediator, or voice of the region auxiliary roles. Instead, Chile voices 
its expectations about G20 governance issues through Mexico. Chile feels that it could be 
a G20 member due to its expertise on global trade and the strength of its national economy. 
In fact, Chile sought, with the support of France, an invitation to the G20 presidential 
meeting in November 2010 in South Korea (but did not succeed). Recently, Mexico invited 
Chile as an active participant to the G20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico (La Tercera 2012). 
Thus, Chile denies Brazil the role of being the voice of South America in this forum, and 
it attributes the role of leader and agenda-setter to the U.S., and that of communication 
channel to Mexico.  
 
 
Venezuela’s Role Expectations of Brazil  
Overview of the Role Relationship 
Venezuela is a revolutionary and an anti-status quo country, not necessarily for its methods 
but ultimately for its objectives. One of these goals is to offer a leadership alternative in 
South America (Trinkunas 2011, 17–24). This ambition shapes the ambivalent relationship 
holds with Brazil, one that oscillates between cooperation and competition. Venezuela 
attributes to Brazil the regional power master role, but that does not exclude the possibility 
that Venezuela could also enact the same role and the leader auxiliary role, whose outcome 
would be the redefinition of South America’s order. As Hugo Chávez stated, “Brazil’s 
leadership is important, but there should not only be one leader. We need many leaderships 
in Latin America” (Diario Las Americas 2008). On the cooperation side, Venezuela sees 
Brazil as being a communication bridge with those states inside and outside the region who 
are opposed to the global projection of the Bolivarian revolution. 
 (Figure 4: HERE). 
 
Role Expectations in the Definition of the Region 
The South American dimension has always been a latent part of Venezuelan thinking, but 
one which became salient when Chávez came to power. The key turning point in enacting 
a South American narrative was when Venezuela became an associate member of the 
MERCOSUR (2004).24  In fact, the process of becoming an active member of South 
America was part of the National Plan of Socioeconomic Development 2001–2007 
(República Bolivariana 2001).  
As Venezuela’s rhetoric against the U.S. increased (Bonfili 2010), the idea of having a 
closed region became part of its maneuvering. For the Bolivarian regime, the U.S. is the 
main security threat (Trinkunas 2011, 20–30). Venezuela’s prioritization of South America 
and the Caribbean, rather than Latin America, is designed to exclude the U.S.—as Central 
America is a disputed zone of influence where the U.S. still carries strong weight despite 
Venezuela’s relationship with Nicaragua under Ortega and its decisive support for the 
launching of the CELAC.  
In fact, an important foreign policy goal is to support social movements in Central 
America so as to contest those governments following the U.S. and its free trade policies. 
Furthermore, priority is also given to the Caribbean region, and especially Cuba, as well 
as to South America—in order to protect national sovereignty from external intervention 
(República Bolivariana 2007, 137, 143). In this sense, Venezuela’s priority for a closed 
South American region matches Brazil’s dominant South American discourse, and also 
shows that Venezuela’s fear of possible hegemony concerns the U.S. and not Brazil. 
However, divergence still exists between Brazil and Venezuela over what South America 
is for, with both presenting different alternatives for regional integration—and thus 
competing with each other for the exertion of a more attractive auxiliary leadership role.  
 
Role Expectations in Regional Integration Initiatives and Regional Crises 
Venezuela has postulated that regional groupings in South America should have a clear 
social component for the Bolivarian revolution to successfully grow regionally. In fact, 
Venezuela expressed its desire to join a new MERCOSUR, and not the old one driven by 
neoliberalism. The Bolivarian idea creates competition for Brazil’s economic and political 
positions on regional integration schemes. When then president Chávez stated that “the 
MERCOSUR is our destiny” (The Economist 2005), or “this is our place, our essence” (El 
Tiempo 2012), he also expected an accommodating policy from Brazil, so as to help the 
country develop a pillar in the institution—upon the basis of a strong commitment to 
develop social policies.  
This pattern of competing visions between Brazil and Venezuela also unfolds within 
the UNASUR. In fact, Venezuela has tried to seize control over this group (Brands 2010, 
37), which has hampered Brazil’s goal of using it as a platform from which to redefine its 
own sphere of influence (Malamud 2011a, 8). However, Venezuela expected more 
regarding defense issues from those cooperating within this forum, specifically through its 
South American Defense Council (CDS). Venezuela wanted a CDS that replicated a 
NATO-like alliance, although Brazil’s goal of having a forum in which to jointly discuss 
and coordinate on how best to tackle security challenges in the region would ultimately 
prevail (Nolte and Wehner 2013).  
Venezuela expects that Brazil creates the necessary space for the former to play a 
leadership role in the UNASUR, specifically within its different existing subgroups. In this 
group, Venezuela attributes to Brazil the coordinator role as a way to lessen Brazil’s 
projection of its leadership role. Moreover, Venezuela’s support for the UNASUR is not 
only because it can use it as an umbrella under which to shelter itself from the U.S., but 
also as a way to project its secondary power status in the region—and thus can exert 
leadership from within this regional organization.25  
Brazil needs us and we need Brazil in the UNASUR, it is a matter of mutual 
dependency, yet we were encouraged to create our own spaces of 
integration from the beginning of the Revolution (…) other spaces of 
integration create more leaderships.26 
Venezuela’s ALBA project competes with Brazil’s regional leadership aspirations, and 
is where Venezuela does not have a direct competitor over the leader role. The ALBA 
promotes the “virtues” of the Bolivarian revolution in Latin America. Venezuela 
challenges Brazil’s regional position by courting and gaining support from, as ALBA 
members, countries such as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (Gerbasi 2012). 
Recently, Venezuela would lead the launching of the CELAC as another arena in which to 
exert leadership and institutionally bind Brazil (Tokatlian 2013), as well as in which to 
create a forum for dialogue over political and strategic issues with Central American states 
and Mexico. Venezuela thus attributes the regional power role to Brazil, but it also 
contends the functioning of it by offering alternatives for regional integration—with the 
purpose of reducing its existing social asymmetry with Brazil.  
Venezuela recognizes the UNASUR as the mediator for regional crises, wherein Brazil 
is also an actor. In fact, the UNASUR had to mediate in the Colombia–Venezuela crisis of 
2010 (Nolte and Wehner 2013).  
It means a lot that the new regional organization (…) prevented the 
possibility of a fratricide war. Néstor Kirchner, as the UNASUR Secretary-
General deserves all our gratitude and our recognition for its patient, 
diligent, and efficient mediating role (Chávez in El Universal, 2010).   
Thus, Venezuela sees Brazil as a mediator in cases where its intervention is the last 
resort, either within the UNASUR framework or on its own—especially in its relationship 
with Colombia and the U.S., which means Venezuela’s validation of Brazil’s master role. 
We expect from Brazil that it mediates, especially if we have serious or 
extreme problems with Colombia, as everyone knows that behind Colombia 
is the U.S. (…) Brazil’s actions could ameliorate tensions with the 
Americans.27 
 
Role Expectations at the International Level 
Venezuela supports Brazil’s claim for having a permanent seat in the UNSC, as a reflection 
of Brazil’s regional status. Venezuela also perceives that an agreement on permanent seats 
will be difficult to achieve because of the different interests at the U.N. However, this 
support does not involve attributing to Brazil the role of being the exclusive voice for the 
region or the recognition of a major power role for it. Venezuela has also other reasons to 
support a permanent UNSC seat for Brazil. First, Venezuela believes that if Brazil does 
eventually gain a seat in the UNSC it will not allow external interference in the region. 
Second, Brazil would possibly be able to hamper the U.S.’ interests in the UNSC if regional 
affairs were discussed there (Chávez 2011). Third, Venezuela sees Brazil as a reliable 
member and a trustworthy communication channel with the moderate states belonging to 
the UNSC.  
When it comes to Brazil’s participation in the G20, Venezuela does not have any 
significant expectations. It simply does not see Brazil as fulfilling a role there, as this 
setting is seen as the expression of U.S. hegemony. However, the picture changes in the 
context of the bilateral relationship Venezuela–U.S. In Venezuela’s attempt to build a 
multipolar system, Brazil is seen as being a key actor. Venezuela has developed a foreign 
policy of alliance-building with antisystemic states, which is concordant with the policy of 
vilifying and depicting the U.S. as a threat (Malamud 2011a, 12). Rather than perceiving 
it as a military guardian, Venezuela sees Brazil as a communication channel should 
tensions escalate with the U.S. Within this context, it also attributes to Brazil, as a last 
resort, the potential role of mediator with the U.S.  
Conclusions  
This article analyzed the importance of Others’ expectations for the constitution and 
enactment of the master role and auxiliary roles of the Self. This analysis is conducted in 
light of the interplay of the regional power and secondary powers in South America, the 
latter as communicators of expectations to the regional power. The article conceptualizes 
regional power as a master role bringing together a positional and interactional 
understanding of status at the regional level.   
Further, the article connected master and auxiliary roles, as the former become the 
mold for performing the set of auxiliary roles. It also demonstrated how the role-based 
interactions between regional power and secondary power are also bound to their 
respective conceptual understandings of their region. In fact, it shows that actors used their 
regional identities strategically—via roles—to contest the rise of the regional power.  
Moreover, the three cases highlight some interesting similarities and differences in the 
expectations voiced. The secondary powers recognize for Brazil the regional power master 
role, as an achieved status. They also attribute and expect from Brazil that it conceives and 
performs a set of auxiliary roles at the regional level, such as leader, mediator, crises 
manager, and/or coordinator. However, these roles are (except for coordinator) to be 
exerted in joint ways or under the umbrella of regional institutions, where diffusion on 
“who” really leads is projected. These expectations are welcomed and incorporated by 
Brazil, especially when it comes to regional crises and to the making of security concepts 
for regional groups like the UNASUR.   
The three secondary powers also behave according to their own expectations, as part 
of their tactics for binding the regional power within regional institutions. Whereas Brazil 
fulfills the expectations of secondary powers by sharing the regional stage with them when 
it comes to the performance of auxiliary roles in regional settings or bilateral contexts, this 
also indicates the importance of their social interaction as much as of the inevitability of 
social structures. Brazil is in part the actor allowing Others to enact auxiliary roles in a 
joint manner. Brazil enacts the master role and its auxiliary roles through the technique of 
depicting itself as a consensus-seeking power. In fact, the way it enacts—and is expected 
to perform—regional duties show traces of this concurrence. This particular way of 
conceiving and enacting both the master and auxiliary roles are also consistent with the 
expectations voiced by secondary powers. Whenever Brazil seems to be leaving behind its 
consensus-seeking ethos regional Others react, and consequently contest the roles. 
Although the cases all talk about Brazil as a regional power, the differences in their 
role expectations are also significant. Argentina and Chile reveal Brazil’s power 
limitations because they attribute such a master role to the whole of Latin America, 
wherein Mexico may also compete for this leadership. Venezuela is the only country that 
attributes the master role in a closed regional space, done due to its own security concerns.   
Venezuela has also created its own regional group from where it can exert leadership 
without internal disputation. Like Venezuela, Chile has also created along with others a 
regional group that excludes Brazil and brings Mexico into the latter’s sphere of influence 
as a possible balancer to it. Yet, Chile does not seek to use the Pacific Alliance to exert 
leadership, given its own symmetry with Colombia and Mexico’s higher status. 
Interestingly Argentina, in holding in a more salient way the role of Brazil’s soft-balancer, 
does not develop regional initiatives independently from the latter; Venezuela, meanwhile, 
is the only country that attributes a mediator role of last resort to Brazil.  
In addition, Argentina’s and Venezuela’s recognition of Brazil’s regional powerhood 
are not correlated with a recognition of Brazil’s global master role, although they are 
receptive to the stronger presence of Brazil in the international arena. Chile, in contrast, 
does ascribe a global role to Brazil. However, the major differences between the secondary 
powers on this point are regarding the performance of auxiliary roles at this level. Chile 
and Venezuela recognize Brazil’s right to join the UNSC, whereas Argentina rejects such 
an option. At the same time, Chile and Venezuela are aware of the veto players involved, 
making any agreement on new permanent seats seem to them liable to be a long-term and 
protracted process. 
Argentina sees Brazil as an ally in issues of global economic governance. However, 
Venezuela does not have expectations with regards to Brazil in the G20, as for it this is 
solely a U.S. enterprise. Whereas Chile recognizes Brazil’s economic weight, it attributes 
the leader role to the U.S. and that of communication channel to Mexico within the G20—
since these are the states with which Chile has greatest similarity vis-à-vis its economic 
model. Thus, Chile does not recognize Brazil as the voice of South America in economic 
matters, and Argentina and Venezuela do not recognize such a role in both security and 
economic issues—that despite Venezuela’s support for Brazil’s claim to a permanent seat 
in the UNSC. For Venezuela, this attribution is designed to keep the U.S. away from South 
America, thus ascribing to Brazil more a role that resembles that of potential veto player 
should the U.S. undertake any initiatives against Venezuela.  
The role expectations of these three secondary powers also indicate that Brazil is not—
or at least not seen as—a consistent regional power performing the regional and auxiliary 
roles in a balanced way across the security and economic domains. This is partly because 
of Brazil’s own limitations, and partly because of the expectations of the relevant regional 
Others. The secondary powers do not allow Brazil’s rise to simply unfold in an unrestricted 
manner. In fact, the three countries seek to prevent a future in which Brazil will have a 
diminished need for regional partners, an outcome likely if its aspiration to being heard by 
great powers increases and starts to be accepted at the global level.  
As a result the secondary powers, aware of the existing social asymmetric system, are 
keen to prevent the emergence of Brazilian regional hegemony—while they also do not 
want the gap in the social regional hierarchy to increase further. Moreover, the three states 
perceive that attributing or not major powerhood to Brazil on global issues is outside of 
their own reach. It is mainly the U.S. and the other permanent members of the UNSC that 
are able to assign this master role. In this sense, one aspect that needs further inquiry is 
whether this master role not being granted by countries such as Argentina and Venezuela 
has negative consequences for Brazil at the global level—that is, whether the great powers 
see Brazil as lacking “regional” legitimacy for its global power status aspiration.   
Although this article has focused on the interaction of secondary powers and regional 
power in South America, it has also advanced generally the importance of the relationship 
between roles and status theoretically—something that has not been consistently 
articulated in the role theory literature on foreign policy analysis.  Moreover, role theory 
also offers the possibility to capture the transition from one master role to another, since it 
adds to status an interactional—and thus dynamic—dimension. Finally, role expectations 
as developed in this article open up a potentially fruitful avenue of research for the regional 
powers research agenda. Role expectations can be a useful analytical tool for determining 
the extent to which a regional power is seen by other states as holding this particular master 
status also in other regions—be the regional context more conflictive or amity-based than 
the case presented here—as well as the reasons and processes through which other states 
accept or reject the master and auxiliary roles (or new ones) in both the regional and 
international systems.  
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NOTES 
1 I refer to Brazil as an aspirant to global powerhood because regional others show skepticism toward Brazil’s 
global ventures, and thus it lacks recognition from regional Others (Malamud 2011a). 
2 Brazil’s candidate for the WTO in 2005 was not elected. Most countries of South America supported the 
Uruguayan candidate (Malamud 2011a). In 2013 Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo was elected as the 
director general. 
3 The years 2012–13 are excluded from the analysis; the same applies for the other two cases. 
4 Hugo Chávez died March 5, 2013. President Nicolás Maduro has kept the foreign policy goals of the 
Bolivarian revolution, despite the economic difficulties at home. Maduro also sees the U.S. as a threat. 
Recently Maduro proposed to revitalize the group the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our 
America (ALBA) as an attempt to reassert Venezuela’s leadership in Latin America (El Nuevo Herald 
2013).  
5 In fact, in his seminal contribution to role theory Kalevi Holsti (1970) criticizes realist accounts for placing 
restrictions on the number of roles that a state can enact—one can, in fact, empirically observe the 
existence of a broader role-set among decision-makers.  
6 For a discussion on the positioning of role theory in the grand theory debates, especially within realism and 
constructivism, see Breuning (2011). 
7  On regional hierarchies and orders, see Lake (2007). On the interplay of hierarchy, hegemony, and 
legitimacy see Clark (2011). 
8 On the connection between balance of power and role theory, see Holsti (1970); on soft-balancing and its 
tactics, see Saltzman (2012). 
9 This does not mean that Brazil has completely left aside its Latin American vocation, which is invoked 
whenever it is considered useful for the achievement of its goals.  
10 The ALBA (2004) is led by Venezuela and brings together left-oriented countries such as Bolivia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. The CELAC (The Community of States of Latin America and the Caribbean), 
established in 2011, involves all Latin American and Caribbean countries. It is a political organization 
to discuss political and security issues. The MERCOSUR (The Common Market of the South), created 
in 1991, includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (currently suspended), Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 
MERCOSUR is an imperfect customs union. The Pacific Alliance, legally launched in 2012, brings 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                            
together the states (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) with a free trade vocation. The UNASUR (The 
Union of South American Nations), constituted in 2008, involves all South American countries plus 
Guyana and Surinam. The UNASUR’s main area of activity is to address issues of security.  
11 26 interviews were conducted in Argentina, 28 in Chile, and 30 in Venezuela in 2010/11. The interviews 
were conducted on the guarantee of anonymity, so as to allow current and former high-level officials to 
speak in a sincere way about their country’s relationship with Brazil. 
12 Personal communication with the Ambassador (I), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2010. 
13 Personal communication with the Ambassador (II), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 3, 2010. 
14 Personal communication with a former undersecretary of foreign affairs, December 7, 2010.   
15 Personal communication with the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Defense, November 26, 2010. 
16 Personal communication with the Ambassador (IV), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2010. 
17 Personal communication with the Director of Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 2010. 
18 Personal communication with the Ambassador (V), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2010. 
19 Personal communication with a former minister of foreign affairs, April 13, 2011. 
20 Personal communication with the former undersecretary (I) of foreign affairs, April 18, 2011. 
21 Personal communication with the former undersecretary (II) of foreign affairs, April 21, 2011. 
22 See the episodes of crises in the section on Argentina. 
23 Personal communication with a former minister of foreign affairs April 13, 2011.  
24 Full membership of the MERCOSUR was achieved on August 1, 2012.  
25 In fact, Alí Rodriguez, a former top official of Venezuela, was the UNASUR’s general secretary from May 
2012 until August 2013.  
26 Personal communication with a high-level official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011. 
27 Personal communication with a high-level official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 6, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
